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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
UNDER THE NEW MEXICO AND
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
LEO M. ROMERO*

In State v. Dorsey' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
results of polygraph examinations are admissible in evidence if sufficient foundation has been laid to show that (1) the polygraph operator is an expert, (2) the particular testing technique used is reliable
and approved by the authorities in the field, and (3) the test results
are valid for the particular subject tested. This decision overruled a
series of cases holding that polygraph results were not generally
admissible. In reaching its decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court
specifically relied on several rules of evidence that were adopted
effective July 1, 1973.2
State v. Dorsey is the first reported case involving the admissibility
of scientific evidence under the New Mexico or the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'
This Article will analyze the Dorsey opinion in light of earlier
cases in New Mexico and recent polygraph cases in other jurisdictions
and will suggest a theory of admissibility of scientific evidence 4
*Associate Professor, UNM School of Law. The author wishes to express appreciation to
his colleagues Professor Henry Weihofen and Professor Lee E. Teitelbaum for their helpful
comments.
1. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
2. The New Mexico Rules of Evidence were adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court
by order on April 26, 1973. The Rules were made effective July 1, 1973, for all cases filed
on or after that date.
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-4-101 to 20-4-1102 (Supp. 1975); 28 U.S.C. §§ 101-1103
(1975). The New Mexico Rules were patterned on the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
U.S. District Courts and Magistrates, 1971 Revised Draft. By order entered on November
20, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States prescribed Federal Rules of Evidence to
be effective July 1, 1975.56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). The rules were transmitted to the Congress
on February 5, 1973. The Congress promptly enacted Public Law 93-12 deferring the
effectiveness of the rules until expressly approved by the Congress. The rules were then
amended in various respects by the Congress and they were enacted into law on January 2,
1975. Pub. L. 93-595 (1975). The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective July 1, 1975.
The New Mexico Supreme Court amended the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, effective
April 1, 1976, primarily to bring them into conformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The 1976 amendments, however, do not include all of the changes made by the Congress in
the Federal Rules of Evidence prescribed by the United States Supreme Court.
4. Scientific evidence has been classified into two types. It may be a means of obtaining
specific data or a means of evaluating the significance of other data. C. McCormick, Law of
Evidence 488 (2d ed. 1972); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 1970, U. Ill. L. F. 1, 5-6. The former type of scientific evidence exemplified by
the polygraph examination, will be the focus of this article.
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under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence.' In addition,
the Rules of Evidence will be examined to determine whether they
embody a new theory of admissibility for scientific evidence or
whether they essentially codify the earlier standard-general acceptance in the scientific community.6
This Article is concerned primarily with illustrating a theory of
admissibility for scientific evidence under the New Mexico and
Federal Rules of Evidence. It will not undertake to set forth the
7
scientific principles underlying the polygraph examination' or to
present the conflicting arguments in the continuing controversy over
5. The New Mexico and the Federal Rules of Evidence are essentially identical as they
relate to scientific evidence.
6. The requirement that scientific evidence must meet the test of general scientific
evidence before it is admissible is discussed infra at text accompanying notes.
7. For a history, details, and an explanation of the polygraph device, see J. Reid & F.
Inbau, Truth and Deception (1966). See also C. McCormick, supra note 4, at § § 203 and
207; A. Moenssens, R. Moses, & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 539-564
(1973); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 999 (Chadbourn rev.). The literature generated by the
polygraph test is voluminous, and much of it is referred to in C. McCormick, supra note 4,
at § § 203 and 207. The following is a selection of more recent articles on this topic. Radek,
The Admissibility of Polygraph Results in Criminal Trials: A Case for the Status Quo, 3
Loyola U. of Chi. L. J. 289 (1972); Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975:
An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 Hastings L. J. 917
(1975); Forkosch, The Lie Detector and Mechanical Jurisprudence 28 Okla. L. Rev. 288
(1975): Roper, The Search for Truth: An Argument Against the Admission of Polygraph
Test Results at Trial, 5 J. Am. Polygraph Ass'n 119 (1975); Sevilla, The Search for Truth &
An Argument for Admission of Polygraph Results at Trial, 5 J. Am. Polygraph Ass'n 118
(1975); Note, The Admissibility of Lie Detector Evidence, 51 N. Dakota L. Rev. 679
(1975); Note, Evidence- Polygraph Testimony-Polygraph Test Results Admissible Under
Certain Conditions, Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile (No. 1), 55 B. U. L. Rev. 302 (1975);
Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1120 (1973); Note,
Pinocchio's New Nose, 48 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 339 (1973); Comment, Evidence-Scientific
Instruments-Polygraph Test Results Admissible Under Limited Circumstances About a
Stipulation by the Parties-Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 9 Suffolk L. Rev. 886 (1975);
Comment, Evidence -Polygraph Tests-The Results of a Polygraph Test are Admissible if the
Defendant Agrees in Advance to the Admission of the Results Regardless of the Outcome,
26 S.C. L. Rev. 766 (1975); Note, Evidence-How Some Courts Have Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Polygraph, 51 N.C. L. Rev. 900 (1973); Note, Hypnosis, Truth
Drugs, and the Polygraph: An Analysis of Their Use and Acceptance by the Courts, 21 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 541 (1969); Note, Evidence-Polygraph Evidence Is Inadmissible in Texas
Despite Stipulation by the Parties, 5 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 174 (1973); Evidence- Voluntary
Polygraph Examination Results Admissible as Expert Testimony, 44 Miss. L. J. 800 (1973);
United States v. Ridling: The Polygraph Breaks the "Twilight Zone, " 23 Cath. U. L. Rev.
101 (1973); The Polygraph: Scientific v. Judicial Acceptance, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 254
(1972); Comment, Polygraph Evidence: The Case for Admissibility Upon Stipulation of the
Parties, 9 Tulsa L. J. 250 (1973); Hearings on the Use of Polygraphsand Similar Devices by
FederalAgencies Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Staff of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
2d Sess., Study of Privacy, Polygraphs, and Employment (Comm. Print 1974); Comment,
The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence Pursuantto Stipulation in CriminalProceedings, 5
Akron L. Rev. 235 (1972); Evidence-Polygraph Evidence, 10 Gonzaga L. Rev. 901 (1975);
Note, The Polygraph as a Dispositional Aid to the Juvenile Court, 9 New England L. Rev.
311 (1974).
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whether the polygraph is a reliable device for ascertaining whether a
person is telling the truth.8 This Article will not deal with policy
considerations that collaterally affect the admissibility of polygraph
examinations, notably the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination

.'

NEW MEXICO BACKGROUND

The New Mexico Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility
of polygraph examinations in State v. Trimble." Trimble held that
evidence of polygraph examinations was inadmissible, even if both
parties stipulated to admission of the examination results. The court
adopted the rationale for exclusion stated in the leading case of Frye
v. United States,' 1 decided in 1923, that the polygraph examination
had not yet gained general acceptance among physiologists and
psychologists as a reliable device to test truth and deception.' 2 This
rationale is significant because New Mexico has adopted the general
scientific acceptance standard stated in Frye to determine admissibility of scientific evidence other than polygraph results.' 3
The phrase "general scientific acceptance" is not clearly de8.

According to C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 506-507,
... the principles underlying the test, the qualifications and procedures of the
polygraph operator, and the considerable statistics developed concerning the
technique, have been subjected to a more searching and critical analysis than
that accorded to any other form of [scientific I evidence.
9. For discussions of the issue of the polygraph test and the privilege against selfincrimination see Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of
Lie-Detection, 70 Yale L. J. 694, 725 (1951); Note, Admissibility of Lie Detector Evidence,
51 N. Dakota L. Rev. 679 (1975); Note, Hypnosis, Truth Drugs, and the Polygraph: An
Analysis of Their Use and Acceptance by the Courts, 21 U. Fla. L. Rev. 541, 549 (1969);
Note, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence Pursuant to Stipulation in CriminalProceedings,
5 Akron L. Rev. 235 (1972); Note, Criminal Law-Unstipulated Polygraph Evidence
Admissible Under Certain Conditions in Criminal Trials-Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No.
1), 24 Cath. U. L. Rev. 368 (1975).
10. 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
11. 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
12. The Court said:
Just when a scientific principle crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.
Id. at 47, 293 F. at 1014 (1923).
13. See, e.g., State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952) (evidence obtained
by the use of Sodium Pentothal), and State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966
(evidence of mathematical probabilities).
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fined."4 Neither Frye, Trimble, nor subsequent decisions have
indicated what the standard means functionally. The lack of definition means that courts lack guidelines for applying the standard. The
phrase is said to require something more than relevancy but something less than infallibility.' s
In addition, the Frye standard has been criticized as obscuring the
proper consideration of scientific evidence under the usual rules of,
evidence:
The ultimate purpose of the Frye rule, the prevention of the introduction into evidence of specious and unfounded scientific principles or conclusions based upon such principles is certainly
unobjectionable. It is questionable, however, whether the Frye rule,
with its introduction of a basic inconsistency into the law of
evidence, is essential to the purpose. Most of the considerations
which have apparently moved the courts to apply the Frye doctrine
to various scientific principles may be adequately accommodated
within the usual rules of evidence, and within the adoption of special
rules of certain ambit.' 6
Not only does the Frye standard obscure the relevancy considerations; it also presents additional problems that may operate to
exclude valuable scientific evidence:
If it must be established that the particular test has received wide
application to show acceptance, a difficult burden may exist if the
scientific principle is logically sound, but, because it is unique, time
has not allowed the required application. In addition, if there is little
opportunity for the application of scientific tests upon which the
evidence may be based, valuable evidence may be unnecessarily
rejected. Further, little room may be left to receive evidence where
differing schools of thought may disagree as to its reliability.' 7
Despite the substantial criticism of the Frye standard for general
scientific acceptance, it continues to be used to exclude polygraph
14. The difficulty of defining what is general acceptance has led to an application of a
test "which is highly selective, although not enlightening as to its details," according to C.
McCormick, supra note 4, at 490. See also Strong, supra note 4, at 11.
15. It has been claimed that the general acceptance essentially imposes a requirement of
infallibility. C. McCormick,- supra note 4, at 490 n. 32. Others, however, note that
unanimity of approval is not required but admit that a lesser degree of acceptance "is
obviously somewhat lacking in definiteness." Strong, supra note 4, at 11.
16. Strong, supra note 4, at 14. See also Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific
Evidence in 0riminal Cases, 8 Utah L. Rev. 313 (1962-64); C. McCormick, supra note 4, at
490-91.
17. Boyce, supra note 16, at 314. See also Moenssens, "Polygraph Test Results Meet
Standards for Admissibility as Evidence," in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 17-18 (N.
Ansley ed. 1975); Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-PlaguedSystem, 26 Hastings L.J. 917 (1975).
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evidence. 1 8 Even some courts that are inclined to admit polygraph
evidence feel constrained to apply the Frye standard.' 9 A number of
recent cases, however, have manifested disillusionment with the
general acceptance requirement, although few courts have expressly
Other courts have admitted polygraph evidence
repudiated it.2
Frye standard ;2" some courts have avoided the
the
without applying
of polygraph results by holding that the
admissibility
the
question of
precludes any review of the general
evidence
absence of foundation
indicated that such evidence might
they
although
rule of exclusion,
were laid.2 2
foundation
a
proper
if
be admissible
Trimble's adoption of the Frye standard remained unquestioned in
New Mexico until 1974, although it was modified in several cases so
that polygraph results could be admitted if the parties stipulated to
2
their admission and if there were no objection at trial. 3
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 7), 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974),
United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See also 34 A.L.R. 145; 23
A.L.R.2d 1306.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'dper curiam,
475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
20. The court in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), did not
apply the Frye standard in admitting evidence of a polygraph examination. It did, however,
mention that "acceptance of the basic theory is a part of the process of making the evidence
relevant," Id. at 94-95. Moreover, the court cited Frye as support for its conclusion that
general scientific acceptance is the appropriate standard for judicial notice, Id., at 94, n. 3.
The court in United States v. DeBetharn, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972) also expressed
dissatisfaction with the Frye standards although it felt constrained by precedent to apply
the requirement and to exclude evidence of polygraph test results.
21. Polygraph evidence was declared admissible in United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp.
522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) where the government, before trial, requested that its principal witness
submit to a polygraph examination and then rejected the conclusions of the test. The court
relied on government's duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, (1963) to disclose any
evidence that may tend to exculpate a defendant. The court never alluded to the Frye
standard. A court-ordered polygraph test was also admitted in a paternity proceeding
without reference to the Frye requirement. In the Matter of Peternity Petition of Stenzel: A
v. B, 71 Misc.2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Family Court 1972). See also Walther v.
O'Connell, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 72 Misc.2d 316 (1972), polygraph evidence was admitted
where the plaintiff and defendant completely disagreed about a purported loan; and State v.
Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213, 278 A.2d 543 (1971) where results of a polygraph test were
admissible for sentencing purposes.
22. See State v. Woo, 84 Wash.2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969).
23. State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786, 788, 461 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1969), held admission of polygraph evidence not to be ground for reversal where the defendant's counsel
stipulated to the admissibility of the results and offered no objection to their introduction
into evidence. A constitutional challenge to the Chavez ruling on privilege against selfincrimination grounds was rejected in State v. Chavez, 82 N.M. 238, 478 P.2d 566 (Ct. App.
1970). The admission of polygraph evidence pursuant to a stipulation and without an
objection was also tolerated by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Turner, 81
N.M. 450, 468 P.2d 421 (Ct. App. 1970), and State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 571,469 P.2d 720
(Ct. App. 1970). In the Turner cases, however, the defendant offered the polygraph
evidence and the issue of its admissibility was not presented on appeal. See also Sutin,
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In State v. Alderete2' the New Mexico Court of Appeals indicated
for the first time that, with the proper foundation, evidence of
polygraph results would be admissible. The trial court's exclusion of
the polygraph results proferred by the defendant was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the foundation testimony was
inadequate; it did not establish that the polygraph operator was
qualified or that the test was based on a valid scientific principle. The
court indicated that if a proper foundation were laid, admission
would be within the discretion of the trial court.' I Writing for the
court, Judge Sutin declared, "Scientific recognition of polygraphic
tests has now arrived." 2 6 The court applied the standard of general
scientific acceptance adopted by Trimble and Frye and decided that
by 1974 the standard had been met.
It is not clear on what basis Judge Sutin found that polygraph
tests were scientifically recognized. The foundation testimony at trial
did not establish general acceptance of the polygraph test. Without
such proof, Judge Sutin's declaration can only be construed as taking
judicial notice of that acceptance. 2 7 But the effect of judicial notice
is to dispense with the foundation requirement for the scientific
validity of the polygraph process. 2 8 Judge Sutin apparently intended
no such result since he required a foundation of testimony that the
proposed test is accepted in the examiner's profession and is reasonably precise in its indications.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wood agreed that polygraph results
may be admitted, but on different grounds. He concluded that
Trimble and Frye had not set a standard of general scientific acceptance but rather had restated the basic requirement of relevancy. He
considered the reference in Frye to general scientific acceptance
merely illustrative of the failure of polygraph evidence to meet the
standard of relevancy; it is this view of Frye that he believed was
adopted by Trimble.
Under the relevancy standard proposed by Judge Wood, polygraph
Evidence-Lie Detector Test-PriorStipulation of Admissibility, 2 Nat. Res. J. 162 (1962).
There are a growing number of cases that admit polygraph results if there is an adequate
stipulation. See C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 507 and the cases cited therein. See also
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). Many of the recent articles discussing the requirement of
a stipulation as a prerequisite to the admissibility of polygraph evidence are cited in notes 8
and 9 supra. See also note 42 infra.
24. 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974).
25. Id. at 178, 521 P.2d at 140.
26. Id.
27. See C. McCormick, supra note 4, at § § 328, 329, 330, for a discussion of judicial
notice. See text accompanying notes 114-125 infra for discussion of judicial notice under
the New Mexico Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
28. Id. See Strong, supra note 4, at 7.
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results are admissible if they have probative value. Probative value
must be established by expert testimony; the test must be "reasonably reliable, reasonably precise and . . substantially accepted by
experts whose competence includes the subject matter of the
tests." 2 9
Six months later, in State v. Lucero,3 0 the New Mexico Supreme
Court expressly overruled the opinions of Judges Sutin and Wood in
Alderete. The Lucero decision not only rejected the Alderete
opinions favoring admissibility, it imposed conditions on admissibility that were not required prior to Alderete. Several earlier New
Mexico cases had recognized the admissibility of polygraph evidence
if only the first two requirements in Lucero-stipulation and absence
of objection-were met. 3' Now the Court set five requirements for
admissibility of polygraph results in all cases:
(1) The tests must be stipulated to by both parties to the case;
(2) No objection may be offered at trial;
(3) Evidence of the qualifications of the polygraph operator must
be offered to establish his expertise;
(4) Testimony must be offered to establish the reliability of the
testing procedure employed as approved by the authorities in the
field; and
(5) The validity of the tests made on the subject must be
established.' 2
The Supreme Court found that the trial court's rejection of the
polygraph test was not error. The requirements for admissibility had
not been met because there was an objection to admission and there
was no evidence "of the reliability of the test procedure in general as
to the validity of [the] results on the appellant." 3
Unfortunately, the Lucero opinion does not explain the rationale
underlying the five requirements it sets forth. It makes no reference
to either of the theories of admissibility advanced in Alderete by
Judges Sutin and Wood, and it suggests no theory of its own.
The first two requirements arguably support a theory of waiver.
Stipulating to the admissibility of polygraph evidence and then
29. State v. Alderete, 86 N.M. 176, 179 (1974), 521 P.2d 138, 141 (Ct. App. 1970).
Judge Lopez' special concurrence, Id. at 180, 521 P.2d at 142, suggests that Judge Wood's
opinion represented the majority position on this issue.
30. 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974).
31. State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786, 461 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Chavez, 82
N.M. 238, 478 P.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1970); State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 450, 468 P.2d 421 (Ct.
App. 1970); State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 571, 469 P.2d 720 (Ct. App. 1970). None of the
above cases mentioned any additional requirement beyond a stipulation and absence of
objection.
32. State v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 686, 688, 526 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1974).
33. Id.
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offering no objection to its introduction at trial could be considered
a waiver 3 4 precluding appellate review. But, if this were the only
theory of exclusion, there would be no need 3to require evidence of

the validity or reliability of the polygraph test.

I

A second possible theory underlying Lucero assumes that the
polygraph test is a reliable and valid indicator of truth and deception.
The third, fourth, and fifth requirements support this rationale. 3 6

However, the first two requirements-stipulation and absence of
objection-would serve no purpose except to exclude valid and
reliable evidence. 7 Scientific evidence other than polygraph results
that has been recognized as valid and reliable may be introduced even
though the party against whom it is offered would prefer to have it
excluded. 8
No defensible rationale of the Lucero case appears that explains all
34. See N.M. Rules of Appellate Procedure for Civil Cases, Rule 11 (1974); and N.M.
Rules of Appellate Procedure for Criminal Cases, Rule 308 (1975). This theory was used by
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786, 461 P.2d 919 (Ct. App.
1970). The court expressed the theory in these words:
With knowledge of the inadmissibility, no objection was made to evidence
concerning the test and the results. We see this as a trial tactic which, in
hindsight, was unsuccessful. We do not see in this a failure to protect the
defendant's rights, a denial of a fair trial, or a denial of due process. The
admission of evidence which could have been excluded was the decision of
defendant and his counsel. Id. at 788, 461 P.2d at 921.
See generally C. McCormick, supra note 4, at § 52. This waiver theory, it should be noted,
has nothing to do with a waiver of one's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The latter waiver theory is discussed in C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 296-300.
35. This theory presumes that the parties are masters of their fate and, therefore, may
agree to the admission or exclusion of any evidence. Courts, however, need not permit
parties to use the courtroom for purposes unrelated to the administration of justice. For
example, no court would conceivably countenance the testimony of a number of witnesses
whose only purpose was to speak before a captive audience just because the parties agreed
to this testimony and no objection was interposed. Indeed, the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence authorize the judge to exercise control over the presentation of evidence so as to
"(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2)
" Rule 611, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-611
[and] avoid needless consumption of time ..
(Supp. 1975).
36. See note 32, supra.
37. Nor can these two requirements be justified as serving any interests protected by the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. These requirements apply when the
defendant offers the test results. Furthermore, they apply when the defendant has previously waived his fifth amendment privilege. In neither of the above situations is there a
fifth amendment problem that the first two requirements need to address.
38. For example, blood tests to determine intoxication, radar checks of automobile
speed, fingerprinting, and ballistic tests are all admissible over objection and without a
stipulation if a proper foundation is laid. See C. McCormick, supra note 4, at § § 202-211.
Indeed, no relevant evidence is excludable simply because a party objects to its admission.
Such a notion is inconsistent with the basic postulate of evidence that "unless excluded by
some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative is admissible." Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 265 (1898).
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five of the requirements. The theory that explains the first two
requirements is inconsistent with the rationale for the last three.
Fortunately, the Lucero decision was short-lived. Six months later
in State v. Dorsey3" the New Mexico Court of Appeals distinguished
it. This case involved the offer of polygraph test results by a
defendant to support his claim of self-defense against a charge of
murder. The polygraph examiner would have testified that the
defendant was truthful in his responses to questions concerning his
defense. The trial court made findings of fact that the polygraph
examiner was qualified and the test scientifically valid and properly
conducted. These findings met the last three requirements of Lucero
and were unchallenged. But the polygraph results were not the
subject of a stipulation, and the prosecution objected to their
admission. The objection was sustained.
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged it was bound by
Lucero, it questioned Lucero's requirements of a stipulation and
absence of objection. 4" Judge Wood sidestepped these requirements
on the ground that they were not embodied in the newly-adopted
Rules of Evidence that had come into effect since the Lucero case. 4
Thus in Dorsey the Court of Appeals found that admissibility of
polygraph tests under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence depended
only on the last three requirements of Lucero. In essence, this is the
theory that Judge Wood articulated in Alderete: polygraph evidence,
if relevant, is admissible under Rule 402 of the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence. 4 2 The trial court's conclusion that the polygraph results
were relevant to the issues raised by the charges and the defenses
thereto rendered the results admissible under Rule 402. 4 3
39. 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1975).
40. Id. at 325, 532 P.2d at 915.
Being bound by Lucero we may not consider the validity of the reasoning
behind items 1 and 2 [stipulation and no objection]. Accordingly, we may
apply neither the trial court's findings nor the concession at oral argument,
which are to the effect that no reasons exist in this case for the exclusionary
rule of items 1 and 2.
41. The New Mexico Rules of Evidence become effective July 1, 1973, for cases filed on
or after that date. See note 1 supra. The date on which the Dorsey case was filed was not
mentioned by the New Mexico Court of Appeals, but the concurring opinion by Judge Sutin
states that the trial court, on October 23, 1973, excluded the polygraph evidence. State v.
Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 326, 532 P.2d 912, 915 (Ct. App. 1975).
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-402 (Supp. 1975), Rule 402 provides for the admissibility of
relevant evidence. For a discussion of Judge Wood' theory in Alderete, see the text accompanying note 29 supra.
43. An additional reason for the holding by the New Mexico Court of Appeals was its
reliance on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The court read Chambers to
invalidate a conviction on due process grounds where evidence of considerable reliability
and importance to the defendant's opportunity to defend himself is excluded. State v.
Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 325, 532 P.2d 912, 914 (Ct. App. 1975). The court found that under
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On certiorari the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the
decision by the Court of Appeals, "but for slightly different reasons.""" The Court reevaluated the validity of the first two conditions of admissibility set forth in Lucero-the requirements of a
stipulation and absence of objection. In a one-page opinion, the
Court concluded:
that these two requirements are: (1) Mechanistic in nature; (2)
Inconsistent with the concept of due process; (3) Repugnant to the
announced purpose and construction of the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence . . . ; and (4) Particularly incompatible with the purposes
and scope of Rules 401,402, 702, and 703 of the New Mexico Rules
of Evidence. 45

The New Mexico Supreme Court thus discarded the first two requirements of Lucero. The remaining requirements were left undisturbed.
After Dorsey the predicate for admissibility of polygraph tests is
evidence that (1) the polygraph operator is a qualified expert, (2) the
testing procedure is reliable and approved by authorities in the field,
and (3) the test results are valid for the subject tested.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's opinion in Dorsey, however,
does not disclose a theory of admissibility for scientific evidence
under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence. The decision alluded to
neither the rationale proposed by Judge Wood in Dorsey and Alderete nor to that of Judge Sutin in Alderete. The Court referred to
Rules 401, 402, 702, and 703 in support of its decision; but failed to
indicate how these rules support the admissibility of polygraph
evidence. Furthermore, the Court offered no explanation for its
departure from the long-standing view that polygraph test results are
generally inadmissible.
A THEORY OF ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE
NEW MEXICO AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

The Dorsey decision is a starting point for a theory of
admissibility of scientific evidence under the New Mexico and
Federal Rules of Evidence. This portion of the discussion will focus
on whether the Rules cited by the Court provide a new theory of
scientific evidence or carry forward the earlier theory of general
scientific acceptance. It will begin with a consideration of the
applicability of Rules 702 and 7034 6 to scientific evidence.
the circumstances of Dorsey, the due process requirement in Chambers applied. Id. at 326,
532 P.2d at 915.
44. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
45. Id. at 185, 539 P.2d at 205.
46. New Mexico Rules of Evidence, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-702, 703 (Supp. 1975).
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Rules 702 and 703
Rules 702 and 703 pertain to testimony by experts. They do not
by themselves set forth a theory of scientific evidence. Rule 702
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise. 4 7
Since a polygraph examiner renders an opinion about a subject that
involves a scientific device that is purported to measure and record a
number of involuntary body responses to the stress produced by
knowing deception, 48 Rule 702 clearly has some bearing on the
admissibility of polygraph evidence.
Rule 702 requires the court to find that there exists scientific or
4
specialized knowledge that will be helpful in a particular case. 1 The
court must evaluate the present state of knowledge about the subject
of the proposed testimony, in this case, polygraph technique." Does
the specialized knowledge of the field of polygraphy produce reliable
opinions concerning truth and deception? Are such opinions based
on a reasonable probability rather than conjecture?' 1 By requiring
that scientific evidence "assist the trier of fact," Rule 702 implicitly
requires that the scientific or specialized knowledge that is the subject of expert opinion be reliable. Therefore, the answers to the
above questions depend upon the reliability of polygraph examination results, which in turn depend on the validity of the scientific
theory underlying the polygraph device. Indeed,
[j] udicial hesitancy in stamping for acceptability expert evidence on
a topic may result from a view that no reliable expert technique has
yet been developed, or from a view that none can ever be developed.
The "lie detector" cases ... illustrate the former attitude. [Emphasis

added.]

52

This judicial hesitancy reflects the notion that polygraph examination results are not yet reliable, hence neither relevant nor capable of
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-702 (Supp. 1975).
48. See J. Reid & F. Inbau, supra note 7, and C. McCormick, supra note 4, at § 207 for a
more complete discussion of the polygraph technique.
7021011 (1975).
49. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence,
50. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 49, at 702-7.
51. Id., citing Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 419 (1952).
52. J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, & Chadbourn, & J. Mansfield, Cases and Materials on
Evidence, 353 (6th ed. 1973).
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assisting the trier of fact.' ' Thus, the question of whether the
polygraph reliably reflects truth or deception is really a matter of
relevancy, a question beyond the scope of Rule 702. The determination of reliability is a question of relevancy to which Rule 401 is

addressed.' '
Rule 703, also cited by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Dorsey,
likewise does not provide a theory of admissibility for scientific
evidence. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferthe subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
ences upon
5
evidence. 5

Clearly, the second sentence of Rule 703 cannot be used to permit
a polygraph "expert" to rely on inadmissible polygraph results in
forming an opinion on deception. Rule 703 is not applicable if there
is no expert, and the determination of whether there is an expert
raises the preliminary question of whether there is a field of specialized knowledge. These issues are addressed by Rule 702."6 To
permit such an independent use of Rule 703 would circumvent Rule
702.
It may be argued, however, that an expert such as a psychiatrist
may rely on the results of a polygraph examination when offering an
opinion as to whether a person is telling the truth.' " But this use of
Rule 703 would also circumvent the requirement of Rule 702 that
53. Authorities agree that the primary issue raised by the question of reliability of
scientific evidence is one of relevancy. Boyce, supra note 16, at 314, puts the issue of
admissibility in these terms, "However, whether a particular bit of evidence is relevant in the
first instance may itself depend upon whether there is a sufficient showing of reliability..."; and Strong, supra note 4, at 3-4, 14, stated that "Scientific evidence ... raises
what is essentially a question of relevancy .. " C. McCormick, supra note 4, also includes
the discussion of scientific evidence in the chapter on relevancy.
54. New Mexico Rules of Evidence, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-401 (Supp. 1975). Rule 401
defines relevancy. The question of relevancy as it relates to scientific evidence is discussed in
greater depth in text accompanying notes 65-92 infra.
55. Id. at § 20-4-703..
56. See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
57. A similar use of scientific evidence was presented in Lindsey v. United States, 237
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956). In that case, the government attempted to rehabilitate a fifteenyear-old rape complainant by calling a psychiatrist who testified that he had given her a
complete examination, including a Sodium Pentothal test, and that he believed she was
telling the truth. A tape recording of the interview with the girl under the influence of
Sodium Pentothal was played for the jury. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
and held that the tape recording was improperly received. The court did not reach, however,
the question of the reliability and admissibility of the Sodium Pentothal test results.
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the information assist the trier of fact. Rule 703 limits the use of
inadmissible evidence by experts to the type of inadmissible evidence
upon which experts reasonably rely. If it can be shown that experts
in a recognized field rely on polygraph tests, even if polygraph results
are inadmissible under other evidentiary rules, the language of Rule
703 would seem to permit an expert to base his opinion upon the
otherwise inadmissible result.' 8 In addition, Rule 705 would permit
the disclosure on direct examination of such evidence underlying the
opinion.5 9 This use of data that is not admissible would require the
court to decide whether the underlying information is "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field .. ."60 In
making that determination, the court has discretion to consider the
reliability of the underlying information.6 This is the same question
it must answer under Rule 702 when deciding whether the subject of
the "expert's" testimony is scientific knowledge. This again is a question of relevancy. 6 2
Thus, Rules 702 and 703 by themselves do not support any theory
of admissibility for scientific evidence. Only in conjunction with the
rules of relevancy do Rules 702 and 703 apply to the polygraph
58. This is the situation posed by Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1956); and referred to in note 57 supra.
59. Rule 705, New Mexico Rules of Evidence, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-705 (Supp. 1975)
provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinions or inference and give his
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required
to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
60. Id. at § 20-4-703. A different question is presented when the underlying basis is
elicited on cross examination. Opposing counsel could insist on the disclosure of unreliable
data for the purpose of discrediting the expert's opinion. Rule 705, New Mexico Rules of
Evidence, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-705 (Supp. 1975).
61. "The kind of data on which an expert may reasonably rely depends on the amount
of certainty that exists about that particular subject." J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note
49, at 703-04.
62. See notes 53, 54, supra and the accompanying text. The phrase "need not be admissible in evidence" in Rule 703 ought not include all inadmissible evidence. The commentary
to Rule 703 suggests that the purpose of the Rule was to permit the expert to rely on
hearsay and opinions that were relevant, but otherwise not admissible. The examples given
by the Advisory Committee include only hearsay statements and opinions. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in J. Moore, Federal Practice 703
(Rules Pamphlet, Part 2, 1975); and in Fed. Rules Evid., Rule 703, 28 U.S.C.A. at 503-04.
The commentary specifically states that "[m] ost of them [the types of inadmissible information upon which an expert may rely] are admissible in evidence, but only with the
expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating
witnesses." Id. Nothing suggests that the Advisory Committee intended to permit an expert
to rely on evidence that is inadmissible because it is either not relevant or too prejudicial.
None of the examples of inadmissible facts or data that may be relied on by experts involve
information that is irrelevant. See J. Weinstein, supra note 49, at 703-7, 8, 9, 10.
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examination and scientific evidence in general. 6 3 Rules 702 and 703,
therefore, cannot be said to constitute a basis for the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 6" Admissibility must be determined according to
the rules of relevancy.
Rules 401 and 402
Rules 401 and 402 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence concern
relevancy. 6 s Rule 402 sets forth the general rule of admissibility for
all evidence.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by constitution, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules adopted
by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 6 6

If polygraph evidence is to pass the first test of admissibility, it must
be relevant. Relevant evidence is defined in Rule 40 1:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence. 6 7

Certain types of evidence are the subject of specific rules of relevancy. 6 8 Rule 401 provides the standard for determining whether
evidence that is not the subject of a special rule is relevant. 6 9 Since
no New Mexico Rule of Evidence specifically governs scientific
evidence, it is subject to Rule 401.
The first question posed by Rule 401 concerns whether the
evidence is related to a fact "that is of consequence to the determination of the action." Polygraph test results were offered by the
defendant in Dorsey to show that he was telling the truth regarding
63. The court in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 95 (E.D. Mich. 1972), stated
that Rule 702 "is only the beginning point in assessing the admissibility of the [polygraphi
evidence."
64. Compare, Walther v. O'Connell, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 72 Misc.2d 316 (1972), where
the Civil Court of the City of New York stated, "This Court has carefully reviewed the
report of the polygraph tests and has decided to admit in evidence the results of these tests
as the testimony of an expert witness." Id. at 387, 72 Misc.2d at 317.
65. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 20-4-401, 402 (Supp. 1975).
66. Id. at § 20-4-402.
67. Id. at § 20-4-401.
68. E.g., Rules 404 and 405 (Character Evidence); Rule 406 (Habit); Rule 407 (Subsequent Remedial Measures); Rule 408 (Compromise and offers to compromise); Rule 409
(Payment of medical and similar expenses); Rule 410 (Offer to plead guilty; nolo contendere; withdrawn plea of guilty); Rule 411 (Liability insurance); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-4-404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 (Supp. 1975, Interim Supp. 1976).
69. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in J.
Moore, supra note 62; Fed. Rules Evid., Rule 401, 28 U.S.C.A. at 84.
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the circumstances of who struck the first blow and who pulled the
first weapon. The polygraph evidence related to the defendant's
credibility clearly a fact that is "of consequence to the determination
of the action." 7"0
The second question posed by Rule 401 concerns whether the
evidence has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact ...
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." If the polygraph results presented in Dorsey tend to make
the fact that the defendant was telling the truth more probable than
it would be without such evidence, the polygraph evidence is relevant
under Rule 401. If the evidence has any probative value it meets the
test for relevancy. 7 1
Whether scientific evidence has any probative value, or, in the
terms of Rule 401, any tendency to prove credibility, is the critical
question. 7 2 Rule 401 does not specify how to determine probative
value, but the Advisory Committee indicated that the answer to this
question "depends upon principles evolved by experience or science,
applied logically to the situation at hand." 7
What principles of experience or science should be applied to
polygraph evidence to determine whether it is probative of credibility? Logically, the scientific principles underlying the polygraph
technique should be considered. If these principles are scientifically
valid in the sense that test results reliably indicate truthfulness or
untruthfulness, the polygraph has a tendency to prove credibility and
is, therefore, relevant. 7"
The question of whether the polygraph examination is valid and
reliable is, however, the center of controversy. 7 s Since this controversy is critical to the issue of relevancy, the method of its resolution
is all important.
Preliminarily, however, it should be noted that the question of the
relevancy of scientific evidence differs from the question of relevancy presented by nonscientific evidence. For example, whether
bootprints in the snow are relevant to show that a person passed by
is a matter of experience and logic. The judge and the jury could
70. J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 49, at 401-15.
71. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 401, supra note 69; J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 49. at 401-18, 19, 20, 27; Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy
in the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 4 Ga. L. Rev. 43, 55 (1969).
72. "Scientific evidence ... raises what is essentially a question of relevancy....
Strong, supra note 4, at 14; accord, Boyce, supra note 16, at 314.
73. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 401, supra note 69, at 85. See J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 49, at 401-28, 29.
74. Boyce, supra note 16, at 314.
75. See note 7 supra and the literature cited therein.
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logically conclude, based on their experience, that the existence of
bootprints makes more probable the fact that a person passed by.
The evidence does not necessarily prove the fact by a preponderance
of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt; but it does tend to
make the existence of the fact more probable than without such
evidence. It is thus logically relevant under Rule 401.7 6
Whether scientific evidence has any tendency to make the existence of a fact more probable, however, is not a matter of experience
and logic. For example, neither the judge nor the jury has any basis
for knowing whether certain test results from a polygraph
examination make the existence of truthfulness or untruthfulness
more probable. Whether such a relationship exists is a matter for
scientific knowledge. Thus expert testimony is necessary to provide
the logical nexus between the scientific evidence and the fact that it
is offered to prove. 7"

The nexus that makes scientific evidence relevant is one of relia76. It is important to emphasize the distinction between relevancy and sufficiency of the
evidence.
The test of relevancy, which is to be applied by the trial judge in determining
whether a particular item or group of items of evidence is to be admitted is a
different and less stringent one than the standard used at a later stage in
deciding whether all the evidence of the party on an issue is sufficient to
permit the issue to go to the jury. A brick is not a wall. C. McCormick, supra
note 4, at 436.
See also James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689 (1941), in
Selected Writings on Evidence (Fryer ed. 1957); Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 Kan. L.
Rev. 1 (1956); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 Vand. L.
Rev. 385 (1952); Weinstein & Berger, supra note 71, 4 Ga. L. Rev. 43, 56.
77. C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 438 n. 28, states that "An important function of
scientific evidence is to supply the link which in other instances is furnished by 'common
sense' or experience," and quotes the following passage from Strong, supra note 4, at 2-3:
Scientific evidence may play a part in this process of conclusion drawing in
two ways. First, science may serve to supply the trier of fact with specific
propositions which neither the trier of fact nor the witnesses could obtain
through the use of unaided or uninformed sensory perception.
The second possible function of scientific evidence is to supply the trier of
fact with general propositions not the product of common experience, which
may then be applied to specific scientific or nonscientific data that has been
introduced in the case. This will allow the trier to draw conclusions from that
data which would otherwise have been either impossible to reach, or at least
impossible to reach with the same degree of certainty. Scientific evidence
serving this second function is usually supplied through the medium of expert
testimony, the expert witness being asked either to supply the general proposition itself or to apply it to an assumed set of data and state a conclusion. The
state of technology being what it is, however, the role of the expert as applier
of general propositions may occasionally be preempted by a scientific device
which not only collects specific data but interprets it in light of some general
scientific principle, as is true of radar devices for detection of automobile
speed.
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bility; 78 and reliability depends on three factors-(1) the validity of
the underlying scientific principles,7" (2) the proper utilization of
the scientific technique, 8 0 and (3) the use of the scientific device by
a properly qualified expert. 8 ' Unlike general relevancy questions,
scientific evidence thus requires foundation evidence regarding

reliability before it is relevant.
Reliability, however, is not a constant. It varies in degree ranging
from minimal reliability to perfect reliability. For example, in detecting truthfulness or deception, polygraph test results may be infallible, totally unreliable, or somewhat reliable. It is important,
therefore, to determine to what degree the reliability of scientific
evidence, in the sense that the underlying principles are valid, must
be established before it is relevant and admissible.8 2 Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, reliability may have to be established
by a preponderance of the evidence;8 3 second, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt may be required; 8 4 third, evidence substantial
enough to support a finding of reliability might suffice;8 ' or fourth,
78. Boyce, supra note 16, at 314.
79. See, Strong, supra note 4, at 13-15; Boyce, supra note 16, at 314.
80. Strong, supra note 4, at 18-22.
81. Id. at 14-15; see also C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 491 and n. 34. A number of
states, including New Mexico, have enacted licensing requirements for polygraph examiners.
See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-31A-1 et. seq. (Repl. 1974); Romig, Status of State
Polygraph Legislation in July 1972, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 44-53 (N.
Ansley ed. 1975).
82. For a discussion of the effect of the varying accuracy of the results of paraffin tests
as evidence of recent use of a firearm, see Strong, supra note 4, at 13. See also Korn, Law,
Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1080, 1111 (1966), for a discussion
concerning the evidentiary use of the "lower accuracy" findings of the social behavioral
sciences.
83. This standard would seem to imply that reliability is a condition that requires a
determination by the court. It is similar to the procedure for the determination of preliminary questions set forth in Rule 104(a). This rule provides:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge, subject to
the provisions of subdivision (b). In making his determination he is not
bound by the Rules of Evidence except those with respect to privileges.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-104(a) (Supp. 1975).
84. This standard differs from the first suggestion only by the standard of proof required
for the finding of reliability by the court.
85. This suggestion is similar to the procedure for the determination of conditional
relevancy set forth in Rule 104(b) [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-104(b) (Supp. 1975)]. This rule
provides:
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition.
Whether Rule 104(a) or 104(b) applies to the determination of the question of the
relevancy of scientific evidence presents an exceedingly interesting question that is beyond
the scope of this paper. For a discussion of the applications of each rule and the rationales
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foundation evidence tending to show that the scientific evidence is in
some degree reliable could be required.'6
It is submitted that the fourth suggestion is the appropriate
standard for the determination of the degree of reliability necessary
to establish the relevancy of scientific evidence. This standard
comports with the definition of relevancy in Rule 401,87 and it
permits the court to decide whether the scientific evidence is logically relevant without requiring that it also meet a standard of proof
such as preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable
doubt.' ' Beyond this threshold, showing the degree of reliability
8 9
would, of course, be a matter of weight for the jury.
Applied to polygraph evidence, this standard would require
foundation testimony by an expert tending to show that test results
are in some degree reliable in detecting truthfulness or untruthfulness. Such a foundation renders test results logically probative of
credibility, and the evidence thus meets the definition of relevancy in
Rule 401. The opponent of the evidence may, of course, contest its
reliability by introducing contrary evidence, but this should not
require the exclusion of the polygraph evidence. Instead, Rule 401
contemplates that the weight of such evidence be left to the jury,
and the jury is free to reject or accept the polygraph evidence.
In summary, the theory of admissibility for scientific evidence
under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence is one of
relevancy. First, scientific evidence must be relevant in order to be
admissible under Rule 402. Second, there must be evidence tending
to show that the scientific evidence is reliable in order to be relevant
under Rule 401.
It is submitted that the theory of admissibility embodied in the
New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence is correct in its treatment
of scientific evidence. Scientific evidence ought to be held to the
same standard of relevancy as is nonscientific evidence. Although
considerations of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or jury

underlying each rule, see generally, E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence (1962), Maguire
& Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 392 (1927); Morgan, Function of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2550
(3rd ed. 1940); J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 43, at 104-9 et seq.
86. This standard is essentially the test for relevancy prescribed by Rule 401. Its provi
sions are set forth at text accompanying note 66, supra; see also the discussion of Rule 401
in notes 71-75 supra, and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. See note 76, supra.
89. See Boyce, supra note 16, at 314 and n. 13.
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competence to deal with scientific issues9 0 may affect the decision
to admit scientific evidence, these considerations do not and should
not affect the theory of admissibility-one of logical relevancy. 9 1
These considerations may, however, operate under Rule 403"2 to
exclude relevant evidence, scientific or otherwise, whose probative
value is substantially outweighed by these considerations.
One question remains about the theory of admissibility advanced
for scientific evidence: should the relevancy of scientific evidence be
left for determination under Rule 401, which applies generally, or
should a special rule be drafted to deal specifically with the relevancy
question presented by scientific evidence. If there is but one theory
of relevancy and it applies to scientific and nonscientific evidence as
well, there is arguably no reason for a special rule. However, scientific evidence does present the relevancy question in a somewhat
different posture. The relevancy of scientific evidence frequently
depends on scientific knowledge, whereas the relevancy of nonscientific evidence generally depends only on ordinary experience and
logic.9 Although this difference presents no problem under Rule
401,9" the application of the general relevancy principles to scientific evidence is not readily apparent, especially regarding the issue of
reliability. Indeed, the general exclusion of polygraph evidence may
be explained as a failure by courts to recognize that any degree of
reliability renders test results relevant to the issue of credibility. 9 '
In view of courts' failure to apply the basic relevancy standard to
polygraph evidence, perhaps a special provision outlining the
90. Id. at 325-26:
There seems to be little reason why courts should not allow juries to hear both
sides of the question of the reliability of a particular form of scientific
evidence and decide what, if any, weight it should be accorded, upon, of
course, a foundation which shows there is a reasonable possibility of reliability.
In this regard the scientific theory of the polygraph is probably no more
difficult to comprehend than are the theories of Freud and Jung. If two
psychiatrists can be allowed to present varying schools of psychiatric thought
to a jury with the ultimate determination of what weight to accord them being
left to the jury, there would seem to be little reason, assuming a showing of
reasonable reliability, why the pros and cons of the operation of a polygraph
should not also be left to the jury's consideration.
91. J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 49, at 401-18, state that, "Any proffered item
that would appear to alter the probabilities of a consequential fact is relevant-although it
may be excluded because of other factors."
92. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-403 (Supp. 1975). The provisions of Rule 403 are set forth
at text accompanying note 101 infra.
93. See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
94. See discussion of the application of Rule 401 to scientific evidence at text accompanying notes 89-96 supra.
95. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 440-491 and n. 32.
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relevancy theory of admissibility should be added to the New Mexico
and Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 6 It could be added as a subdivision
of Rule 401, entitled "Relevancy of Scientific Evidence." Its terms
might provide:
401(a). Scientific evidence is relevant according to Rule 401 if there
is foundation evidence having any tendency to make more probable
that the scientific evidence is in some degree reliable in showing
what it purports to show.

Until such a provision is added, however, the relevancy of scientific evidence must be decided under the general relevancy rule, Rule
401.
THE GENERAL SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE STANDARD AND
THE NEW MEXICO AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

The preceding section sets forth a theory of admissibility under
the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence. Neither set of Rules
makes express reference to a standard of general scientific acceptance. This portion of the discussion will consider whether, and to
what extent, the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly adopt a requirement of general scientific acceptance.
Rule 401 and the GeneralScientific Acceptance Standard
Rule 401, which defines relevancy, the criterion above proposed
for admission of scientific evidence, 9 does not expressly require
general scientific acceptance of a particular scientific device before it
becomes relevant. The essential requirement for relevancy of scientific evidence is reliability. Nor does Rule 401 suggest a requirement
of general acceptance; applied to the polygraph, it requires evidence
having some tendency to show that the polygraph device reliably
detects truth or falsity. This tendency, or probative value, can be
established without demonstrating general scientific acceptance.
Testimony that the polygraph device is supported by valid scientific
principles should suffice to make more probable the existence of the
polygraph's reliability.
Thus, a requirement of general scientific acceptance would appear
to impose a more stringent condition for establishing relevancy-a
96. Neither the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence (1942); the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974);
nor the California Evidence Code (1965) include special provisions for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence. B. Witkin, California Evidence 592 (1966), states that
scientific evidence "is not governed by a distinct set of rules; the usual rules apply ..
97. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. See also the preceding section.
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condition that is inconsistent with Rule 401 .9 8 For example, the
foundation evidence introduced in Dorsey tended to prove that the
polygraph is reliable-and indeed such a finding was made by the trial
court-even though there was no evidence that the polygraph
examination is generally accepted as reliable in the scientific
community. Even if evidence had been introduced that the polygraph technique was unreliable or not generally accepted among
scientists, such evidence would not have defeated the determination
that the foundation evidence was sufficient to present the test results
to the jury. Such evidence contesting the reliability of the results
would merely affect the weight to be given the evidence. 9 From the
conflicting evidence regarding polygraph reliability, the jury could
decide to what degree the results are reliable and how much weight
to give them in assessing the credibility of the subject of the examination. Therefore, the question of whether the polygraph examination has achieved general scientific acceptance would not affect the
first question of relevancy and, therefore, admissibility, under Rule
401. It may affect the jury's later determination of whether to
accept or reject the examinee's version of the facts.
Although general scientific acceptance of the polygraph examination is not required under Rule 401 to establish relevancy, the
absence of general scientific acceptance may yet operate to exclude
polygraph evidence under Rule 403.10 It provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' 01

Rule 403 permits the judge to balance the probative value of
proffered evidence against the possible harmful consequences specified in Rule 403 and to exclude relevant evidence if, in the exercise
of his discretion, he determines that the possible harm substantially
outweighs the probative value.' 02
If the court finds that the foundation evidence is probative of the
98. C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 489-91, suggests that the requirement of general
scientific acceptance imposes a special rule of admissibility for scientific evidence better
suited to the taking of judicial notice than to determining simple relevancy; a standard
of
relevancy should be the only requirement. See also Strong, supra note 4, at 14.
99. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
100. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-403 (Supp. 1975).
101. Id.
102. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence;
J.
Moore, supra note 62; 28 U.S.C.A. § 403, at 102. See also J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra
note 49, at 403-7, 8.
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polygraph's reliability but does not establish general acceptance in
the scientific community, it may consider whether the dangers
specified in Rule 403 may substantially outweigh the probative value
of the test results in the absence of general acceptance. The Advisory
Committee explained that the danger of unfair prejudice "means an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
3
though not necessarily, an emotional one."'0 Testimony by a
polygraph expert may tend to overimpress the jury because the
opinion as to credibility is based on "scientific" evidence. In fact, the
fear that juries are awed by scientific evidence and may give too
much weight to such evidence has been suggested as the real reason
for excluding polygraph evidence." 04
The absence of general scientific acceptance may, in addition, raise
the dangers of "confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."' 0"
These dangers are present when the evidence creates "a side issue
1
that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues."' 6 For
example, if witnesses are called by both sides regarding the reliability
of the polygraph technique, the trial may be unduly prolonged as the
1
issue becomes a major concern of the litigants. o ' A criminal or civil
trial may be turned into a forum for the litigation of the reliability of
scientific evidence.
The recent case of United States v. Ridling,108 decided prior to
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, considered the possible
dangers of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading
the jury in connection with the proffer of polygraph evidence. The
court found that the dangers cited in Rule 403 did not substantially
outweigh the strong probative value of polygraph evidence in a
perjury trial.' 0 9 Moreover, the court indicated that the dangers of
undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury
103. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403, supra note 102.
104. See, e.g., C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 490 n. 32; Boyce, supra note 16, at 322.
105. Rule 403, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-403 (Supp. 1975).
106. C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 439. See generally J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 49, at 402-23, 24; 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 443 (3d ed. 1940).
107. This would raise the Rule 403 "considerations of undue delay, waste of time." N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 20-4-403 (Supp. 1975). J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 49, at 403-29,
suggest that courts in cases involving confusion of the issues or misleading the jury are "in
fact excluding evidence because an unsuitable amount of time would be consumed in
clarifying the situation."
108. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
109. Id. at 95; accord, United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 691 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); compare Lindsey v. United States, 237
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956) where the court excluded the tape recording of a Sodium Pentothai test because of the difficulty that a lay jury would have in properly evaluating the
evidence.
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would be minimized if the test were performed by court-appointed
experts.' ' 0

It should be emphasized, however, that it is within the discretion
of the court to balance the probative value of offered evidence
against the dangers specified in Rule 403.11 ' The assessment of the
probative value of polygraph evidence will often depend upon the
purpose for which it is offered and the strength of the foundation
evidence. The Ridling decision specifically referred to its importance
in a perjury trial and to the record indicating the validity of
polygraph theory.'

1'2

It would appear, therefore, that when the

necessity for polygraph test results is greater, the opponent has a
greater burden to show that the dangers stated in Rule 403 substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.' 3
Rule 201 and the General Scientific Acceptance Standard
Although general scientific acceptance of the polygraph examination is not required under Rule 401, the proponent of such evidence
is certainly not prohibited from establishing its general acceptance in
the scientific community. Such proof, according to McCormick,
would make possible judicial notice of the validity of the scientific
theory underlying the polygraph examination.' 14
Under the Federal and New Mexico Rules of Evidence, judicial
notice is governed by Rule 201.'' I This rule provides that the court
110. 350 F. Supp. 90, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The appointment of court-selected experts
is authorized by Rule 706 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-4-706 (Supp. 1975).
111. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 49. at 403-12, 13, 14. 15.
112. 350 F. Supp. 90, 95 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
113. Where credibility is a critical issue in a case, however, the possibility for undue
prejudice is apt to be greater. Cf., Luck v. United States, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 151. 348 F.2d
763 (1965); Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1967), where standards were established to assist the court in
balancing the possible prejudice against the probative value of prior convictions used to
impeach credibility. See also Rule 609, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-609 (Supp. 1975).
114. C. McCormick, supra note 4, at 491.
115. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-201 (Supp. 1975). Rule 201 only governs judicial notice of
adjudicative facts. Id. at § 2 0-4- 2 01(a). "Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the
particular case." Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
J. Moore, supra note 62; 28 U.S.C.A. § 201, at 53. Under this definition, the validity of the
scientific theory supporting the polygraph test would be a fact that could be the subject of
judicial notice. Legislative facts, defined as those which have relevance to legal reasoning and
the law-making process, are not the subject of judicial notice under Rule 201. Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 201, Id. Judicial notice is an especially appropriate device for
determining the relevancy of evidence. It will often supply the hypothesis that gives
evidence its probative value. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 49, at 200-24, 25, 26,
27, 28, for a discussion of this use of judicial notice. See also Korn, Law, Fact, and Science
in the Courts, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1080, 1110 (1966) for examples of this use of judicial
notice with regard to scientific evidence.
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may take judicial notice on its own initiative;' 16 but it must take
judicial notice if requested to do so and if the necessary information
to support judicial notice is supplied.' ' 7 The standard for judicial
notice is set forth in Rule 20 1(b):
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the community, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,
or (3) notice is provided for by statute.' 1 8
Under Rule 201(b) the essential prerequisite of judicial notice is a
high degree of indisputability.' ' 9 Assuming that proof of general
scientific acceptance would suffice to remove reliability from controversy, the court must, if requested, take judicial notice of that
fact.' 2 0 Of course, the propriety of taking judicial notice may be
contested, and evidence may be introduced to rebut the indisputability of the polygraph's reliability.' 21
The effect of judicial notice is prescribed in Rule 20 1(g):
In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to,
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.' 22
Rule 201(g) thus dispenses with the need to prove a fact that is
judicially noticed. After judicial notice is taken of the validity of the
scientific evidence, the proponent of such evidence need not provide
a foundation regarding the validity of the scientific theory underlying the evidence. Nor may the opponent introduce evidence
contesting that fact.' 23 Foundation evidence regarding the qualifications of the examiner and the proper manner of conducting the
examination would, of course, still be required.' 24
116. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-201(c).
117. Id. at § 20-4-201(d).
118. Id. at § 20-4-201(b). Federal Rule 201(b) does not include the third method of
establishing judicial notice. 28 U.S.C.A. § 201 (b).
119. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 201, supra note 115.
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-201(d).
121. Id. at § 20-4-201(e). This subdivision provides that, 'A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice
and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be
made after judicial notice has been taken."
122. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-201(g).
123. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 201(g), supra note 100; Strong, supra note
4, at 7.
124. Strong, supra note 4, at 8-9, observes that "Where notice is taken merely for this
limited purpose [to establish the validity of the general scientific principles] , of course
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If the standard of general scientific evidence does not remove the
issue of reliability from "reasonable dispute," 1 2 I proof of general
scientific acceptance may still be important to the proponent of
polygraph evidence. For example, polygraph experts may testify that
the results of properly conducted tests are generally accepted as valid
and reliable in the scientific community. They may admit, however,
that the polygraph examination is not infallible. Such proof might
enhance the probative value of polygraph evidence, and it may
decrease or eliminate the possibility that the relevance and, therefore, the admissibility of polygraph evidence could be contested.
CONCLUSION

The New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence provide a framework for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on these Rules of
Evidence in Dorsey may indicate a move toward a less restrictive
theory of admissibility for scientific evidence. The Court did not
refer to the old requirement of general scientific acceptance, and the
new Rules of Evidence to which it did refer include no such requirement.
In addition, the new Rules of Evidence provide a framework for
dealing with an evolving scientific process. 1 26 When a scientific
process is so new that its reliability and, hence, its relevancy are
uncertain, Rule 403 permits its exclusion on the ground that the
dangers of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, and waste of time substantially outweigh its probative value.
When the scientific test is subjected to greater use and evaluation and
gains greater acceptance, the probative value would not be substantially outweighed by those dangers, and the evidence should be
admitted for the jury's consideration. Finally, when the scientific
principle has become so well established that it is generally accepted,
Rule 201(b) permits the courts to take judicial notice of the basic
principle.
The Dorsey opinion places polygraph evidence in the second stage
of the evolutionary process.1 27 Dorsey requires foundation evidence
of the validity of the principles underlying the polygraph examinaexpert testimony will still often be required as to the correct conclusion to be drawn from
application of the principle to specific data offered or to be offered in the case."
125. This possibility assumes that the standard of general scientific acceptance requires
more than relevancy but less than infallibility. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
126. This evolutionary process is described in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90,
94 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
127. The court in United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 95 (E.D. Mich. 1972)
indicated that the polygraph examination is presently in one of the first two stages.
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tion in every case in which polygraph evidence is offered. Dorsey also
permits the opponent of polygraph evidence to contest the validity
of those principles in every case. The effect of Dorsey is to require
the litigation of the reliability of polygraph evidence on a case-bycase basis. This procedure will continue until judicial notice is taken
of the validity and reliability of the polygraph technique.
Although the procedure mandated by Dorsey may seem wasteful
of time and effort, this result is not peculiar to scientific evidence.
The admissibility of evidence is frequently conditioned on a proper
foundation. Moreover, this procedure permits the proponent to
introduce scientific evidence while at the same time it allows the
opponent to contest its reliability. It is only when there is no longer
any real controversy over the reliability and validity of the scientific
technique that judicial notice makes this procedure unnecessary.

